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In this paper two broad schools of linguistics are referred to:
transformational-generative grammar (TGG), philosophically ra-
tionalistic and psychologically cognitive, and the more empirical
and behavioristic linguistic thought: the empirical theory of
language (ETL), stemming from "structural" linguistics. Their
views on word meaning are considered in Sections 1 and 2, and
the third Section suggests a basis for defining word meaning
which is thought to be more intuitively viable.
1. Word meaning in ETL
1. I For and against the ideational theory
Much of the discussion on word meaning prior to transforma-
tional grammar can be viewed as the ideational theory vs.
various attempts to avoid it. This theory, basically, goes back
to the ancient Greeks, though it is currently common to quote
John Locke as a more recent representative: "The use, then,
of words is to be sensible marks of ideas; and the ideas they
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stand for are their proper and immediate signification."1 What
might be called "word meaning" is in this way equated with
"ideas." Criticisms of this view and alternative suggestions have
resulted, and a brief review of some of these will interest us
in this section.
The reason for dividing pre-TGG explanations of word mean-
ing into for-and-against the ideational theory is that ETL defini-
tions appear to originate in some objection to this theory.2 Robins8
objects to equating word meaning with ideas, on the basis that
such a position tries "to explain and define public phenomena
(speech, writing) primarily by reference to necessarily private
phenomena" (ideas). He goes on to imply that an empirical
science cannot deal with phenomena which are not publicly ob-
servable (apparently ruling out the data provided by introspec-
tion).4 Robins feels that "it is not easy to say what an idea is"5
and simply concludes that meaning is not an idea and that it "is
best to regard knowledge of meaning" of a word "as an ability
to use the word in ways other people will understand...." The
ideational theory, apparently, is abandoned in principle. Like-
wise, Alston objects that "we do not settle questions about mean-
ing by looking for ideas in the minds of speakers and listeners. "6
He confuses, apparently, -what meaning might be and ho-w we
come to know what it is.
Carroll,7 a "moderate" behaviorist, speaks of the "danger that
one may lapse into philosophical dualism." On the one hand
positing internal or mental entities appears so tempting or obvious
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that there exists the great danger of reverting to it, while, on
the other, such a move must be avoided at all costs. We are
therefore expected to "think of subjective behavior as a series
of responses," so that we can succeed in avoiding any disussion
of consciousness. Carroll maintains that "there are publicly
observable indices of subjective events," but does not explain why
he is sure there are subjective events at all; "subjective events
may be assumed to follow much the same laws" as observable
events; but the reasons behind this assumption are not explained,
and we must not think that the internal "guides or directs overt
behav ior."
For some empiricists, idea or concept must be read image.
Hormann points out that "In Saussure the object, which he calls
signifie, is not the object itself, but the concept, something rather
like an idea or an ideal image of the object. This view has led
psycholinguistics again and again to the conception of the object
as an image. The meaning of a word such as 'Eiffel Tower,'
then, consists in the image of the edifice that the word evokes
in the hearer. But what image corresponds to the word 'animal'?
Has it fur, feathers or scales; and has it fins, feet or wings?
And what does the image of 'justice' look like?"8 The point
is well taken. It is only an extreme enpiricism which would try
to explain ideas in terms of images.
Although ideas may be difficult to define, there have been
attempts among non-philosophers.9 Chafe10 assumes that ideas
"have some kind of electro-chemical existence in the nervous sys-
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tems of individuals."ll Although his remark is made in passing,
he is apparently describing "meaning" with this sentence. It is
difficult to understand how an electro-chemical state will account
for knowledge (ideas): Is "beauty," for example, the same thing
as a nervous state? If not, what is the relationship between the
two? If there is a relationship, what is it that relates to the
nervous state?
These being a few of the criticisms of the ideational theory, let
us turn to some of the suggested alternatives. All have in com-
monthe definition of meaning in terms of something observable,
and differ, basically, only with respect to what observable entity
is chosen be equated with meaning.
1.2 Meaning as situation
Bloom field, who subscribed to Watson's extreme form of be-
haviorism, denned the meaning of a linguistic form as "the situa-
tion in which the speaker utters it and the response which it
calls forth in the hearer."12 Similar views can be seen in Fries'
"sociocultural meaning"13 and Harris' associating morpheme
meaning with social situation.14 And Robins, after outlining
Firth's concept of the context of situation, goes on to say that
"meaning is therefore not a single relation or a single sort of
relation, but involves a set of multiple and various relations
holding between the utterance and its parts and the relevant
features and components of the environment, both cultural and
physical, and forming part of the more extensive system of in-
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terpersonal relations involved in the existence of human socie-
ties."15
But how realistic is it to include under meaning all factors
which determine sentences spoken? The sentence meaning would
the be said to include all manner of information which is already
obvious and which, therefore, need not be communicated at all.
By extension, the speaker would be able to produce only the
sentence whose meaning is reflected by that situation. It would
seem reasonable, in fact, to consider more or less the contrary:
that the determining influence of context and situation of sen-
tences is one of eliminating meanings which need to be expressed.
A more sophisticated approach (in least in terminology) to
associating meaning (in this case, sentence meaning) with situa-
tion is Alston's "illocutionary act potential,"16 which "enjoins
members of a speech community from uttering Ca^] sentence, in
certain contexts, unless certain specified conditions hold."17 By
way of example, Alston takes the sentence Please pass the salt,
which would be covered by a rule that no one must utter this
sentence outside a situation in which the following conditions
hold:
(a) Someone, H, is being addressed.
(b) It is possible for H to pass the speaker some salt.
(c) The speaker has some interest in getting H to pass
him some salt.
But, in fact, the possible conditions could be gleefully extended
without any conceivable limit. Consider, for example:
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(d) H is not deaf; or, rather, the speaker assumes he is
not unless the speaker assumes (or hopes) that H
can read lips (in which case, add the condition that
H is looking at the speaker).
(e) H is not asleep; or, rather, thespeakerassumes he is
not unless the speaker intends by the sentence to
rouse H to consciousness as well as to have him pass
the salt.
etc.
Nor is it clear that Alston's three conditions are at all essential.
Cannot one mutter the sentence to himself, or his dog? Can the
speaker always know if H is able to pass the salt? Must the
speaker be interested in getting the salt, instead of, for example,
just striking up a conversation? In a word, trying to formalize
meaning in terms of situation takes one nowhere but precisely
to the situation (or, to any number of possible situations)
with no clue as to what the meaning of Please pass the salt is.
1. 3 Meaning as response
Meaning as equated with response raises a number of obvious
problems, some of which have been criticized by TGG authors.18
It could imply, for one thing, that the speaker is not aware of
the meaning of what he says until after taking note of his hearer's
reaction, or that his meaning is two-fold if two hearers react
differently to his sentence.
C. Osgood and others hoped to show that meaning could be
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represented by responses made in a controlled laboratory setting.
One approach he mentions is to ask directly for the meaning.
Of course, the typical reaction to this is anything but eloquent;
there will be fumbling about for words, corrections, and, no mat-
ter how much time is provided, seldom a complete satisfaction
with one's own definition. (The response would come much
faster and with much more conviction, if the subject had access
to a dictionary.) If, then, even in this situation, the response does
not equal meaning in the subject's own estimation, how can res-
ponse in general be equated with meaning?19
Another approach suggested by Osgood to formalize meaning
through response is to elicit associations. But there is no reason
in principle to assume that concepts associated with a given word
will lead to its meaning at all. Given certain practicaldifficulties
of an administrative nature in eliciting associations, Osgood sug-
gests playing "Twenty Questions," forcing a choice between,
for example, opposite adjectives: "Is it hard or soft," etc.20 But,
in this case, there is no end to responses which might be elicited.
And if some arbitrary limit is imposed, it is due to prior know-
ledge of the meaning. (In any case, there is something absurd
about asking whether the word sophisticated is hard or soft,
fast or slow, as most non-psychologists might agree.)
Elicitation experiments designed to determine word meaning
seem to glory in the experimenter's blissful ignorance of just what
that word might mean. But justas we know that the word has
a meaning, so we know the meaning. And we know which
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questions will best elicit that meaning and which responses best
reflect it. And thus is it possible to judge the relative success
of an experiment and revise the ground rules to assure better
success the following try where all the while the ultimate
success is not finding out what the word means, but merely
discovering what series of questions will enable some other person
to tell us that meaning.
1.4 On -word usage and referents
Wittgenstein's definition of the meaning of a word as "its use
in the language"21 is another attempt to bring this evasive concept
out into the open. He likens words to tools, which are defined
by their diverse functions.22 Usage, certainly, is an interesting
reference when discussing meaning, since it provides harder data
than intuition and because there is evident correlation between
meaning and replaceability: If there were X and Y replaceable
in all contexts, they would be unanimously accepted as synony-
mous. Though there is no such pair,23 there are grades of pro-
ximity to it. Boy/lad come closer to this replaceability than do
boyIgirl, boy/man, boy/puppy, etc., and boy/lad obviously come
closer to synonymy than the other pairs. Usage is also an im-
portant criterion for determining traditional dictionary defini-
tions.24
It is clear, though, that meaning and usage cannot be equated.
Note that (1) erroneous usage is recognized (and, in the case
of the dictionary writer, weeded out) on the basis of a priori
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knowledge of word meaning;25 (2 ) equating meaning with use
would rule out potential novel uses of a word that do not change
its meaning; ( 3 ) usage is determined partly by form rather than
meaning.26 In Ullraann's words, "The use of a word, its dis-
tribution, the collocations into which it enters, are not identical
with its meaning; they are mere consequences and manifestations
of the meaning, even if, for metholodological reasons, one may
feel that it is through these consequences and manifestations that
meaning can be most profitably explored."27
Replaceability could reasonably be taken to indicate meaning
"overlap." This would leave us with no real synonyms, it is
true, but this too is reasonable in the following: (1 ) The pro-
ponents of rather extensive synonymy provide no clear criterion
for determining synonyms. There seems to be no real wayof
verifying supposed intuitions on identity of meaning, when in-
dividuals (including linguists and lexicographers themselves)
differ on whether X and Y mean thesamethingor not.28 (2)
Difference in usage indicates some difference between any two
forms which in almost all cases cannot be attributed to the
sound. (3) There is no need of grouping various forms under
the same meaning as there might be if given general intuitive
agreement in a language community. ( 4 ) Equating the meaning
of pairs like boy/lad of violin/fiddle is simply an extension of
the referential theory of meaning: both words of a pair appear
to cover the same class of referents. The full application of this
criterion, however, leads to problems like equating morning star
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and evening star (both Venus), as Frege pointed out.
TGG, to digress a bit, has created some intricate confusion
regarding the roles of intuition and usage in distinguishing and
in identifying word meanings. Different "senses" of a single
words are distinguished on the basis of usage,29 while different
-words are equated in meaning by invoking intuition. But if
either one of these criteria were followed to its final consequences,
it would bear out the other in that different forms reflect different
meanings, though ever so subtly just as differences in usage
will be just as subtle.
2. Word meaning in TGG
Attempts to explain word meaning in some observable way were
seen to identify meaning with one or other observable aspect
surrounding language use which does not happen to be the sound
itself. The approach in TGG is radically different. This school
is less taken up by a craze for observability, and, in this sense,
can be likened to the natural sciences, where constructs, con-
cepts, symbols, etc., are posited and theorized upon without scru-
ple. It must be noted at the start though, that TGG theory will
not provide a definition of meaning, since TGG linguists con-
sider it too early to do so.30 This must await development of
the over-all theory.31
Another point to be borne in mind is that analysis of word
meaning in generative formulation does not, strictly speaking,
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have as its goal to express meaning at all,32 but to provide a
criterion for predicting certain sentence types : ambiguous, analy-
tic, etc. On this point Katz, for example, does not seem entirely
consistent. He states that "the job of the dictionary is to represent
the conceptual structure in the meaning of words," which seems
to mean to represent word meanings. But he goes on to say,
and more typically, that the dictionary must represent "every
piece of information about the meaning of a word required by
the projection rules in order for them to operate properly."33
There is no guarantee providing the information required by
projection rules will result in "full analyses of word meanings."34
It may only result in distinguishing words somehow, and it will
leave untouched any differences between words which are classi-
fied a priori as synonymous. In fact, it is suggested by Katz
and Fodor that the semantic component as a whole should be
denned as a description minus the grammar,35 i. e. whatever else
is required for sentence generation. This highly idiosyncratic
view of meaning will be useful only to those who accept TGG
as a whole.
2. 1 Semantic markers and words
Analysis of a word meaning should be expected to provide the
make-up or whatever meaning structure a word might have.
According to semantic-marker analysis, ,36 a word like bachelor.
for example, is defined with the markers (PHYSICAL OBJECT),
(LIVING), (HUMAN), (MALE), (ADULT), and (NEVER
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MARRIED).37 The aim is to arrive at the "complex conceptual
structure"38 of a morpheme (though examples in various works
give only an unordered list of such markers).39 Semantic markers
are intended as a set of formal features which will describe word
meanings in a non-circular way.40 Such constructs, like (HU-
MAN), are therefore not to be considered words themselves, a
point which Katz tries to illustrate by referring to theoretical
constructs, like force, in the sciences.41 This approach is in-
tended to provide semantics with a metalanguage in which to define
meanings, thereby avoiding the circularity of defining words with
other words.42 It must be noted, however, that the meanings of
semantic markers currently used to illustrate this theory appear
to differ in no way from the meanings of the words with which
they are represented. (HUMAN), in capitals, seens to represent
precisely the meaning of the word human.
The parallel with other sciences is fortunate. The concept
force attempts to represent a reality in a way which is true of
many words. The fact that its definition is more rigorously sta-
ted in the science, or that scientists may have a clearer idea of
the meaning of force, does not implythat it is not a word. It
is an error of semantic-marker analysis to suppose that concepts
entirely independent of existing words can actually be set up.
New theoretical constructs are understandable only insofar as they
modify concepts which are already understood and insofar as the
modifications themselves are understandable. This means that
ultimately some relationship (even if remote) must hold between
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a newly defined concept, word, or construct and the knowledge
or belief it previously represented. It is only natural that both
force and (HUMAN) be based on the very words force and
human. A theory will be valuable only if it is understood; and
it can be understood only if its original concepts (the starting
point of its elaboration) are understandable to the theorists. The
science clarifies and modifies these concepts, but it is precisely
these concepts which the science modifies.
Normally there is no clear demarcation between a word and
a scientific construct expressed by that word, both of which are
publically accepted notions. There are merely numberless possi-
ble interpretations (degrees of understanding) according to the
familiarity any individual has with the science in question.48
Note, in fact, a sort of "feedback" process, in which a word
chosen by a science and given a clearer definition tends to evolve
in that direction in the language at large. As knowledge ac-
quired by scientists becomes, to some extent, general knowledge,
the word meaning (of force, for example) is affected (judging
from revisions thereby the made in our traditional dictionaries);
i. e. the meaning, hopefully, reflects a bit more accurately the
external realities. This feedback essentially amounts to a private
meaning or concept (of individual scientists) influencing public
(linguistic) meaning an obvious phenomenon which is ex-
plainable if the word meaning is somehow linked to knowledge
of the world. Thus, a common-sense (conventional) concept or
word meaning is given a scientific definition which, in the long
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run, influences the conventional definition. Were this not the
case, science would not raise the knowledge of the general public,
and there would not be expressions like nuclear energy in com-
mon coinage. The fact that scientists presumably understand
these concepts in a more accurate way does not mean that these
concepts are not words when used in the science. A farmer may
understand heifer better than a nuclear scientist, but this does
not necessitate classifying heifer as a construct rather than a
word.
This "feedback" phenomenon and the view of word meaning
as evolving according to the demands of newly acquired know-
ledge seems implicit in remarks by J. L. Austin, who felt that
the stock of words we presently use "embodies all the distinctions
men have found worth drawing, and the connections they have
found worth making, in the lifetimes of many generations."44
It follows that likening semantic markers to scientific cons-
tructs is not equivalent to showing they are not words. It seems
to show precisely the opposite.
Defining words in terms of "constructs" specially set up, then,
will tell us nothing about those words until such constructs are
themselves defined in terms of what we already know. In the
case of semantic markers, we could consider three conceivable
sources for definitions of symbols like (HUMAN), (MALE),
(MATERIAL), etc. ( 1 ) They might be defined to some extent
in terms of other markers: (MALE) means (PHYSICAL OB-
JECT), (ANIMATE), etc. However, this is circular. (2)
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(MALE) may be said to mean whatever is common to the words
man, bull, bachelor, rooster, etc. But this is also circular, since
the raison d'etre of the markers is precisely the contrary: to set
forth just what isthe meaning of man, bull, etc. (3) Finally,
we may make (MALE), (HUMAN), etc. comprehensible to us
by equating them to the meanings of the words male, human,
etc., but this would remove any need of semantic markers in the
first plase.
The circularity of defining words with other words may be
inescapable. But this would be only natural, in a way, since, to
the individual, a word expresses his knowledge of some reality
what he understands about it. Therefore a definition, if it
is supposed to be understood, ought to be presented in words. In
this way, too, the language can parallel more directly the realities
it signifies: just as word W1 is defined in terms of words Wz
and W*, so is reality R1 constituted by realities R2 and Rs.
2. 2 Markers and traditional definitions
Katz informally considers semantic markers in three ways. The
first is a "decomposition of the sense" being represented,45 on the
supposition that they present "atomic elements" of meaning,46
but is is clear from the remarks above that they are no more atomic
than the words used tosymbolize them. The markers themselves
decompose into other markers, as is evident in Katz's redundancy
rules.
A second way of considering markers, according to Katz, is
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"as the elements in terms of which semantic generalizations about
senses can be made."47 Thus the marker (OBJECT) represents
an element present in the words chair, hat, planet, etc. as oppo-
sed to breath, truth, ripple, etc. This is true, of course, for the
very word object. And this fact is capitalized on in the tradi-
tional genus-difference definitions, which delimit a word meaning
by assigning it first to a general class and then indicating what
characterizes the word within that class.
The third way Katz views semantic markers is as a means of
explaining inferences evident in certain sentences.48 Thus, the
sentence There is a chair in the room implies any of the follow-
ing sentences:
There is a physical object / something / an artifact / a piece
of furniture / something portable / something having legs /
..../in the room.
It is evident, though, that a word implies its definition (in the
traditional sense), i. e. that implicit in the word chair are the
meanings of its defining words: physical object, artifact, fur-
niture, etc., and that this traditional analysis of word meaning
is at least equally capable of explaining such inference.
Weinreich suggests that there should be as few markers in a
semantic description as possible.49 But the fewer the markers, of
course, the greater will their number be in each "reading." Birn-
baum feels that they would "amount to a considerable number."50
The most economically worded readings, of course, leads back
to the traditional genus-difference definitions, the result of which
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is as many markers as there are words in the language under
question (assuming that any two words in a language have dif-
ferent meanings). In that case, it is easy to see Bolinger's point
that this approach amounts to doing "what dictionary-makers have
been doing all along."51 And it is difficult to see, on theother
hand, what advantage there might be to reducing the number of
markers (by eliminating the more inclusive or abstract markers)
at the expense of longer definitions or "readings."
2. 3 Semantic markers and anomaly
Another motivation for semantic-marker analysis of word mean-
ing is to provide objective constructs which will predict, lin-
guistically, the anomaly or nonanomaly of any sequence of
words.52 Thus, the sentence Students complete the woman is
predicted to be anomalous since restrictions on objective-of com-
plete rule out the occurrence of woman here. This, however,
leaves unaccounted for the nonanomalous interpretation of this
sentence in the case that woman actually refers to some artificial
representation (like a statue) of a woman. If senses of woman
are distinguished {person vs. artificial representation of a per-
son) so as to allow for nonanomalous interpretation of the sentence,
is it also necessary to distinguish between senses of house, as in
John completed the house (where John may be either a carpenter
or an artist)? If we do not distinguish, the ambiguity remains
unresolved; if we do distinguish between house and represen-
tation of house, must we also distinguish between painting of
ON WORD MEANING 39
a house (which cannot be completed by a sculptor) and sculpture
of a house (which cannot be completed by a painter) or any other
representation of house which cannot be completed by some con-
ceivable subject of the sentence?
If, as Katz suggests, sequences like honest babyá" should be
blocked by semantic markers, should we also block:
10-year-old doctor
honest child ("acrp nnsnprifiprn
, ^-o~ -! yDaa DaDyr
Where do we draw the line in the following sequence:
honest (1 2....n)-year-old?
At what age will semantic markers allow a child to be honest?
Should we block reference to an honest man who has not matured
beyond a 2-year-old mentality?
Harrison observes that competence, according to generative
grammar, includes the ability to recognize the correctness or in-
correctness of any concatenation of linguistic signs, but that, if
correctness depends on extralinguistic fact, the generative-
linguistics program is incompletable, since this would call in the
"indefinitely variable content of (one's) experience."54 In the
examples cited above it is clear that both context and situation
can be determining factors in classifying sentences as "correct,"
"anomalous," "unlikely," "well formed," etc.
It is inappropriate to assign exclusively to linguistic compe-
tence the ability to discriminate correct and incorrect sentences
(concatenations of signs). The sign stands for something which
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can be evaluated against knowledge, not only of language, but
also of extralinguistic fact or belief. If we find furiously sleep
ideas green colorless odd, we have linguistic (syntactic) reasons
for it. But the sequence colorless green ideas sleep furiously
is unacceptable due to the fact that ideas do not sleep; they are
not green; and, if they were, they would not be colorless
not due to the "non-Englishness" of the combinations. I revolt
against the latter example for its unreality, not because I speak
English. Calling it linguistically anomalous on top of that is
redundant.
TGG severs word meaning from knowledge of the word. It
is assumed that sentences are produced and interpreted entirely
on the basis of a closed set of linguistic rules, that knowledge
of the world (or any other nonlinguistic factor) does not enter
into this interpretation. This naturally leads to classifying as
linguistic any factors which influence interpretation. It is clear,
though, that sentences are understood or interpreted differently by
different individuals and differently according to context. What
is necessary is to isolate the linguistic factors from the rest, not
to assign them all to linguistics.
Determining possible or permissible combinations of meanings
implies ruling on possible realities.55 And, in any case, to say
that "square circle" is incorrect because of semantic-marker make-
up is to give no explanation at all. The explanation of its ano-
maly lies in the real world, the real reason for the incompatible
definitions of these two words and this is not a linguistic
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question.
2- 4 A contribution to philosophy?
The TGG view on anomaly is better understood in the context
of its avowed philosophy. The endeavor to assign syntactic mar-
kers to meanings so as to avoid accepting sentences like the tree
thanked him comes directly from the tendency to consider truth
to be that which is known, ratherthan that which is. Just as
cartesian rationalism considered as real that which existed in
mind, rationalistic linguistics attempts to impose cogno-linguistic
restrictions on what exists outside the mind, restricting, for ex-
ample, the verb thank to human subjects a position which is
redundant, to repeat, if it is clear that, in fact, only humans
thank.56 The insufficiency of this approach is evident in the
examples above. Whether or not sentences about an honest 6-
year-old are acceptable or not is not a linguistic question nor one
concerned with mental structures. Aqceptability has to be judged
against specific situations in reality. Honest wormsis anomolous
simply because worms, in reality, are not honest. Semantically,
in fact, such a concept is quite interpretable, and we are therefore
able to say it is mistaken.
One of the attractions of semantic-marker analysis is the propect
of arriving at a set of universal features of meaning." Katz
already discusses a rather ambitious application of universal mar-
kers to a philosophical problem: the formulation of "semantic
categories," which he sees as formalizing Aristotle's categories.
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He claims that a language basis provides empirical justification
for categories (presumably metaphysical categories). But it would
be more accurate to say that they merely provide justification for
universally used (i. e. not language-specific) concepts or mea-
nings. And, in spite of the factthat he refers to his own effort
as "correct and exhaustive," he is actually doing something es-
sentially different from Aristotle, whose categories are reality-
based. Katz is talking about language, assuming that whatever
happens to be universal in linguistics carries philosophical im-
plications. It is to be recalled, too, that the very foundation of
this effort the semantic marker is extremely hypothetical
and depends on the viability of TGG syntactic rules (which TGG
semantics merely complements), and that the whole TGG system
is ultimately conditioned by rather unsure criteria like the sim-
plicity metric. If it is true, besides, that features or markers do
not differ in meaning from the words used to symbolize them,
then we will find universal meaning features only insofar as there
are universal -word meanings, And there must be very few of
these, leaving them with very little value in a semantic theory
or in philosophy.
It was suggested above that semantic theory seems less con-
cerned with conceptual structure as it is with providing a des-
cription of those aspects of meaning which allow word senses to
function in the grammar and this according to the rules of
generative transformational grammars. This is seen both in the
way that markers are arrived at and in their actual application.
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For this purpose it is merely required that words assumed to have
different meanings be distinguished somehow, not necessarily on
the basis of a formalization of intuitive notions of meaning itself,
but rather in terms of the environments in which they correctly
occur (which, as mentioned above, comes close to equating mea-
ning with distribution or usage, to which TGG authors object).58
The rationalism of transformational grammar is evident here,
whereby ( 1 ) influenced by the thesis of innate ideas, it is supposed
that all speakers of a given language (of all languages, in fact)
are in possession of an identicle set of semantic features, and
(2) as a result, it is felt that a language need only distinguish
combinations of features (in words) in order to succeed as a
medium of communication (speaking now of the word level).
Also as a result, (3 ) the nature of these features (their origin,
their relationship with the external world, their make-up or struc-
ture, and, certainly, their "meaning") need not be explained,
because they are common knowledge or self-evident.
This is one aspect of an oz;er-idealization in TGG, which ig-
nores individual competence and, consequently, variations in
knowledge and meaning interpretation from one individual to
another. Some idealization and simplification is natural in theory
construction, but, in this case, it has given no explanation of
just what word meaning is and has provided us, instead, with
simply a description of word usage designed to make syntactic
rules work. An approach to word meaning based on constructs
independent of the individual's knowledge of the world, severs
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language meaning from external reality, reducing it to a closed
(rationalistic) system of mental entities (a set of innate ideas
or "structures").
And this is the basis for supposing that all anomaly can be
predicted. For just as Cartesian philosophy held that the mind
determines (imposes order on) reality, TGG linguists now hold
that anomaly (impossible realities) can be determined a priori
and predicted by a study innate language in the mind.
Perhaps weaknesses of rationalist linguistics will make their
contribution to philosophy by bringing out into the open weak-
nesses of rationalism itself.
3. Word meaning and knowledge of the world
3. 1 Word meaning
There is a general tendency among people to equate, more or
less, their knowledge of the meaning of a word, as they under-
stand it, with the knowledge they have of its referents. And
this point is a datum of common sense (intuition) which requires
explanation.59 This equation is reasonable in that (1 ) there
appears to be no essential difference, in the individual, between
these two kinds of knowledge either in their acquisition or
in their use in thinking; and that (2) knowledge of word mea-
ning grows together with knowledge of referents (consulting a
dictionary will enhance both).
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Three aspects of human knowledge might be considered in this
connection: perception, images, and concepts. They relate, in
that order, in an ascending abstractness, and of the three, con-
cepts appear to be most closely linked with word meaning. It
is fairly evident that ( 1 ) the concept is more public, being some-
what removed from perceptions, which are individual-specific; 60
(2 ) the concept is formed to some extent under the guidance of
the word-sound, whereas perceptions and images are not; ( 3 )
both the concept and the word prescind of individual objects and
images and cannot be fully illustrated with a finite number of
pictures or images; ( 4) there is a closer numerical relationship
between concepts and word-sounds than between images and
word-sounds; (5) classification of various images (of one or
various referents) under a single word already implies a concept.
However, it is clear that these two notions are not equivalent:
( 1 ) Knowledge is individual-specific, whereas linguistic meaning
istaken to be public;61 (2) in typical language use,the mean-
ing of a word is assumed known to the hearer even when
ignorance of some aspectof the referent is assumed; ( 3 ) attempts
by an individual to define a word involve sifting out those aspects
of his knowledge which he does not consider commonor public
knowledge.
Related to these common-sense notions, let us turn to a dis-
tinction between empirical and rational ideas made by Jolivet.
Empirical ideas express, and depend on, experience, and they
signify not so much what a thing is in itself, as whatit is in
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relation to the knower. (Milk for a child is a drink, while for a
milkman it is a source of income.) These ideas are rich and
confused and prone to change with new experiences. Rational
ideas represent things as they are, independent of experience.
Thus, for example, are scientific ideas, which represent essential
features and are free of subjective elements like visual recollec-
tions. In the individual, however, a rational idea, though very
abstract, is generally tied up with imagery; and a science can be
considered to express ideal ideas those which would be com-
pletely rational in an individual if they existed precisely as de-
fined by the science.
What a word "means" to an individual, likewise, does not
generally equal its definition in a traditional dictionary, but takes
in his own experiences and relative understanding, different from
other users of the language. The linguistic meaning of many
content words can be taken to be common or public knowledge
relating a sound to a class of referents, in a form which is purged
of any individual's perceptions or image-memories of specific re-
ferents. This public "knowledge" is restricted to essential fea-
tures, by which referents qualify for membership in the class of
objects governed by the word.
3. 2 Word meaning in communication
Let us note now a tendency in communication to express
through language what is not already assumed known to the
hearer by virtue of, for example, past education and experience
ON WORD MEANING 47
or present situation or context, including gestures, facial expres-
sions, cries, sounds made by the hands, whistling, patting, hit-
ting, etc. To the extent that this is so, whata person says is a
direct indication of assumptions he makes about the hearer's
ignorance. Typically, assumed ignorance of a fact is expressed
in the explicit predication of a VP to an NP, whereas implicit
predication found in the internal make-up of an NP in many
cases indicates that the hearer is assumed aware of the predication
as such.82 The distinction is important because, generally, the
motivation behind explicit predication is to inform the hearer;
and this is often the reason for producing a sentence in the first
place.
The make-up of an NP, then, is greatly influenced by suppo-
sitions about the listener's knowledge. Though a great many
ideas can be represented by single words, reference to specific
objects often requires modification of nouns. And reference to
a specific reality requires modification of the abstract phrase-head
noun precisely to the extent that the hearer would otherwise be
left ignorant of which reality is refered to. (Here, again, we see
an essential difference between explicit and implicit predication in
that the former is not a modification and not required for the
hearer to identify the referent of the subject noun.)
The general tendency to express explicitly in language only
what the hearer is presumed ignorant of can be referred to as the
principle of simplification ofform. It is a cover rule which also
takes in pronominalization and deletion,63 including a rule sug-
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gested by Chafe: "If we disregard other complicating factors,
in general an item can be pronominalized after it has appeared
once in the linearized postsemantic sequence. Thus we can say
Walter promised that he •Ewould come but not He promised that
Walter could come if it is the same Walter that is refered to in
both cases."64 A syntactic criterion will not explain all prono-
minalization, however. Consider these examples:
(a) No, it's imitation, (a woman's reply to anotherwo-
man's inquisitive glances at her large diamond-like
ring)
(b) It'sa bird! It'sa plane!...
In (a ) discourse analysis will not explain it, because the word
ring does not occur. And in (b) the pronoun does not replace
any noun, but only a referent in the external world. Any such
examples, as well as Chafe's, fall under the cover rule which
simplifies forms as far as possible considering the needs of the
hearer for identifying a referent.
The hearer's knowledge can be assumed for any number of
reasons which go beyond sentence or discourse-level meaning.
The principle of simplication explains a very wide range of data
in performance which will be valuable to investigate.
In this context, then, the use of word meaning in communi-
cation will also be an interesting study. A word is often used
presupposing more of the hearer than merely knowledge of the
word's meaning, taking in familiarity with specific referents as
well. Depending on the extent to which the speaker is acquainted
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with the hearer, assumptions vary greatly, due to a common edu-
cation or experience, or any number of factors. On the other
hand, communication succeeds even given faulty command of
word meaning and more on the basis of perceptual knowledge
of referents. In every case of linguistic communication, how-
ever, there seems to exist in the minds of the speakers, first, a
distinction between word meaning and knowledge of referents
beyond that, and, second, an implicit intention to be using words
in accordance with their publicly accepted meanings.65
NOTES
1. John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. Ill, Ch.
2, Sec. 1; noted in Alston (1967, p.235).
2. Lyons (1971, p. 401-2) notes that today even some philosophers find
themselves dubious of mental realities.
3. Robins (1964, p.22).
4. In explaining that linguistics is an empirical science, Robins gives
the reason that "its subject matter is observable with the senses, speech
as heard, the movements of the vocal organs as seen directly or with
the aid of instruments, the sensations of speaking as perceived by
speakers, and writing as seen and read" (1964, 7). Observability,
however, is not what makes a science empirical, so much as a "con-
firmability," by which the abstract statements of linguistics are sub-
stantiated or reputiated on the force of observable evidence or gene-
rally accepted intuition.
5. Robins (1964, p. 22).
6. Rf. Alston (1967, p. 235).
7. Carroll (1955, p. 72); emplasis added throughout this paragraph.
8. Hermann (1971, p. 28). Harrison (1972, 44) too criticises the image
theory of meaning, which claims that ostensively defined basic symbols
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(and thoughts?) could be replaced by sets of pictures. He points out
convincingly that such portrayals are as variously interpretable as real
objects themselves. The point is well taken. Reality is interpretable
in any member of ways. And there is no clear limit to the distinc-
tions which might be made in interpreting it. There are indeed,
at least as many ways as there are languages insofar as they differ
in their grouping of realities under words. Thus, equating word
meaning with images or with the real objects themselves share the
defect of not explaining differences in meaning (from language to
language) in the face of a common real world.
9. Gilson (1969) is amused by linguists who attempt to make philoso-
phical statements without realizing they are stepping out of their own
field.
10. Chafe is not a representative of ETL, but rf. Sell (1979) on the
philosophical similarity of ETL and TGG.
ll. Rf. Chafe (1970, p. 16).
Rf. Alston (1967, p. 235).
12. Bloom field (1933, p. 139); emphasis added.
13. Noted in Hermann (1971, p.44).
14. Cf. Harris (1952, p.356), though Harris is not equating meaning
with situation so much as suggesting situation as a possible approach
to morpheme meaning.
15. Robins (1964, p. 27); emphasis added.
16. Rf. Alston (1971, pp. 35-6).
17. See also Vasiliu (1973) for a similar view.
18. See, for example, Katz (1971, p.87f).
19. See also Alston (1967, p.235f).
20. See Osgood (1963, p.306f) for a discussion of the problem oi the
semantic universality of such judgments.
21. See also Robins (1964, p.20).
22. On this subiect, see also Ullmann (1972, p.347); and Katz (1966,
p.78).
23. Rf. Lyons (1971, p.73) on this point.
24. Harris (1954, p. 43 f) discusses the correlation between difference of
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meaning and difference of distribution.
25. This point is also mentioned by Ullmann (1972, p.348).
26. Rf. Ullmann (1972, p.348) and references there;and Katz (1972,
p.442).
27. Ullmann (1972, p.350).
28. The French Academy, for example, insist that there are no synonyms
in French.
29. This is ironic, since TGG disclaims basing meaning on usage. See,
for example, Katz (1971, p.93); Katz (1972, p.442); and Caton
(1971, p. 12).
30. But TGG authors speak of what meaning is not; see, for example
Katz (1972, p. 441 f) and cf. Jackendoff (1974, p. 2).
31. Cf. Chomsky (1964, pp. 73-4, 94).
32. Cf. Katz and Fodor (1963, p.480f).
33. Cf. Katz (1966, p.154).
34. Ibid.
35. Cf. Katz and Fodor (1963, p.483f).
36. Ibid.
37. For an application of this approach to English, see G. Leech, (1969).
38. Rf. Katz (1966, p.155).
39. McCawley (1974, p. 29) points out that "there is no general agree-
ment as to the nature of semantic structure."
40. Rf. Katz (1966, p. 173) and Chomsky (1958, p. 223).
41. Rf. Katz (1966, p.156).
42. Cf. Katz and Fodor (1963, p.517).
43. This is true also of chemical symbols used by Katz in illustration.
H, C and O, though once removed from normal orthography, still
represent words.
44. Noted in Katz (1966, p.86).
45. Rf. Katz (1972, p.40).
46. Cf. Postal (1964, p. 168).
47. Rf. Katz (1972, p.41).
48. Ibid.
49. Cf. Katz's (1972, p.78) criticism of Weinreich.
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50. Rf. Birnbaum (1970).
51. Cf. Katz (1972, p.86).
52. See, for example, Postal (1964, p. 161).
53. Rf. Katz (1966, p.161).
54. Rf. Harrison (1972, p. 21-2).
55. In spite of Chomsky's comments more or less to the contrary (1961a,
p.384).
56. Cf. Hermann's reference to Kant (1971, p. 300), who felt that the
mind determines reality.
57. Cf. Katz (1966, p.224f).
58. Cf. Katz (1972, p.442).
59. Carroll (1964, p. 219f) takes issue with the separation of meaning
from concept and suggests that "a framework can be made for con-
sidering their intimate interconnections." Bellert (1973, p. 68) also
refers to knowledge of language as "intrinsically interconnected with
knowledge of the world." See Vygotsky (1962, p. 60), who speaks
of the futility of separating the mind from the world, leaving
"thoughts thinking themselves."
60. Carroll (1964 a, p. 221) traces similarity of concepts among people to
similar experiences, but also because of the public word which fosters
this similarity by grouping experiences in similar ways for different
individuals in a language community.
61. DeCecco (1967, p. 62) also makes clear reference to private vs. public
meaning, and Carroll (1964 b, p. 82) states that concepts vary accor-
ding to the individual, whereas meaning is more constant; in(l964,
p. 393) he speaks of meaning (as vs. concept) as "socially-standard-
ized."
62. Oim (1973, p.361) says that "the aspect of the hearer....is most
significant" in the problem of predication. (In connection with the
general thesis of this section, Oim goes on, more generally, to say
that "language as a whole exists for hearers and because of hearers.")
63. It is also a more natural explanation than the "drive" toward eco-
nomy that Chafe speaks of (1970, p.54).
64. Rf. Chafe (1970, p.53).
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65. The general feeling that word definitions in traditional dictionaries
are accurate is due precisely to their public or conventional acceptance.
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